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INTRODUCTION
Recent Supreme Court holdings have opened the door to
unprecedented levels of campaign spending by both candidates and
third parties.1 Independent spenders are unrestricted in the amount
they spend in support of or in opposition to candidates.2 Public

* Amy Loprest is the Executive Director of the New York City Campaign Finance
Board.
** Bethany Perskie is an Associate Counsel at the New York City Campaign Finance
Board.
1. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct.
2806 (2011); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310(2010); Davis v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008); SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
2. Candidates are allowed to spend unlimited amounts of their own funds on
their own campaigns as well. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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financing systems are not permitted to provide additional financial
assistance to publicly financed opponents of highspending,
independently financed candidates. To avoid having the entire
spectrum of political speech dominated by wealthy individuals and
special interest groups, state and local governments must administer
public financing programs that maximize the impact of small
contributions while avoiding the type of “trigger” system that the
Court has deemed an unjustified infringement on First Amendment
rights.3
The New York City Campaign Finance Program (the “Program”)
seeks to achieve this end with its low-dollar multiple match system,
which awards public funds at a six-to-one ratio for small contributions
to participating candidates, who must adhere to an overall
expenditure limit.4 The multiple match element of the Program
provides participants with the ability to challenge candidates who are
heavily financed by their own personal funds and/or those of
independent spenders.
Because the spending of an opposing
candidate does not trigger an award of additional matching funds, the
Program is compliant with the parameters set forth by the Supreme
Court.
This Article will address the evolution of the Court’s jurisprudence
on high spending candidates and outside actors; judicial challenges to
the Program; New York City’s experience with high spending
candidates; the increasing prevalence of independent expenditures in
federal and local elections; and how the City’s low-dollar multiple
match functions as an effective and constitutional offset to these
candidates and outside spenders. The Article concludes that, despite
the influx of money from independent spenders and wealthy selffunded candidates, low-dollar multiple match public financing
systems can ensure that ordinary citizens have a voice in today’s
elections.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History of the New York City Campaign Finance Act
In the late 1980s, New York City government was racked by a
series of scandals involving city officials soliciting favors from those

3. See infra notes 99–104 and accompanying text.
4. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-705 (2012).
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seeking contracts with municipal government.5 Several officials went
to prison and Donald Manes, Queens Borough President and head of
the borough’s Democratic County Committee, committed suicide.6
Gene Russianoff, an attorney for the New York Public Interest
Research Group, stated that although the investigations did not
actually involve campaign money, “there was a sense at the time that
the scandals represented something broader . . . it was a concern
about the culture.”7
The Campaign Finance Act (the “Act”), proposed by then-Mayor
Ed Koch, was passed by the New York City Council and signed into
law on February 29, 1988.8 Its stated purpose was to bring greater
accountability to the political system.9 On November 8, 1988, the
public overwhelmingly approved a city Charter amendment
establishing the independent and nonpartisan Campaign Finance
Board (the “CFB” or “Board”) as a Charter agency.10 In passing the
Act, the City Council found that:
[B]oth the possibility of privilege and favoritism and the appearance
of impropriety harm the effective functioning of government. The
council further finds that whether or not the reliance of candidates
on large private campaign contributions actually results in
corruption or improper influence, it has a deleterious effect upon
government in that it creates the appearance of such abuses and
thereby gives rise to citizen apathy and cynicism.
The council further finds that it is vitally important to democracy in
the city of New York to ensure that citizens, regardless of their
personal wealth, access to large contributions or other financial
connections, are enabled and encouraged to compete effectively for
public office by educating the voters as to their qualifications,
positions and aspirations for the city.11

5. See generally JACK NEWFIELD & WAYNE BARRETT,
AND THE BETRAYAL OF NEW YORK (1988).

CITY FOR SALE: ED KOCH

6. Id. at 97–104.
7. Jarrett Murphy, The Price of Politics: 20 Years of Campaign Finance Reform
in New York City, CITY LIMITS, Fall 2008, at 6.
8. 1988 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 8.
9. Id.
10. N.Y.C. CHARTER ch. 46; N.Y.C. CHARTER REVISION COMM’N, DECEMBER
1986–NOVEMBER 1988 REPORT 24 (1989).
11. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-714 Historical Note (2012); 1988 N.Y.C. Local Law
No. 8. The U.S. Supreme Court has since shown disfavor for part of this justification
for campaign finance reform measures—increased electoral opportunity—as a
legitimate government interest. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club
PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2825–26 (2011).
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The 1989 citywide elections were the first test of the Program. The
CFB disbursed $4.5 million in public funds to thirty-six candidates.12
The 1989 elections were also historic in that David Dinkins defeated
three-term incumbent Koch in the Democratic primary, going on to
become the city’s first African-American mayor.13 1993 brought
another citywide election in which a challenger, Rudolph Giuliani,
unseated the incumbent mayor, making Giuliani the first Republican
mayor in twenty years.14 Voters also passed a referendum limiting all
city office holders to two four-year terms.15
The term limits first took effect during the 2001 citywide elections,
also the first in which the Program employed a multiple match system
for disbursing public funds.16 In October 1998, the City Council
passed an amendment to the Act providing that candidates could
receive public matching funds at a rate of $4-to-$1 in exchange for
agreeing not to accept contributions from corporations.17 The
following month, voters adopted a Charter amendment that
prohibited candidates from accepting corporate contributions. The
CFB had issued an advisory opinion stating that if the Charter
amendment passed, all candidates would be eligible for the $4-to-$1
match.18
The Giuliani administration disagreed with this
interpretation and challenged it in court.19 Before the court challenge

12. See N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: DOLLARS AND
DISCLOSURE: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY 99 (1990), available
at http://www.nyccfb.info/press/news/per.htm.
13. Id. at 34–36.
14. See 1 N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., ON THE ROAD TO REFORM: CAMPAIGN
FINANCE IN THE 1993 NEW YORK CITY ELECTIONS 77 (1994), available at
http://www.nyccfb.info/press/news/per.htm.
15. 1993 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 94.
16. See N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., AN ELECTION INTERRUPTED... …AN
ELECTION TRANSFORMED: THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE PROGRAM AND THE 2001 NEW
YORK CITY ELECTIONS (2002) [hereinafter N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., REPORT ON
2001 ELECTIONS], available
at http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/per/2001_PER/
2001_PER_Vol.1.pdf.
17. 1998 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 48; see also, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., REPORT
ON 2001 ELECTIONS, supra note 16, at 2. The matching rate previously was one-toone for contributions up to $1,000. The $4-to-$1 match was on contributions up to
$250. See id. at ix.
18. Advisory Opinion 1998-2 (N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd. Oct. 23, 1998),
http://www.nyccfb.info/act-program/ao/AO_1998_2.htm.
19. See ANGELA MIGALLY & SUSAN LISS, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, SMALL
DONOR MATCHING FUNDS: THE NYC ELECTION EXPERIENCE 13 (2010), available at
http://brennan.3cdn.net/8116be236784cc923f_iam6benvw.pdf.
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was heard, the City Council amended the Act again, over Giuliani’s
veto, to confirm the $4-to-$1 match.20
The combination of term limits and the new multiple match system
made the 2001 elections the busiest in the CFB’s history, with 353
participating candidates and over $41 million in public funds
disbursed.21 In addition, the terrorist attack on the World Trade
Center on September 11, 2001 occurred on primary day. The primary
election was postponed and the CFB’s offices, located several blocks
from the World Trade Center, were evacuated. The CFB continued
to operate from temporary offices at Fordham University’s Lincoln
Center campus.22 The 2001 election also saw the first time in the
Board’s history that a nonparticipant was elected mayor. Michael
Bloomberg spent over $73 million on that election, which raised
questions about the continued viability of the matching funds
program. Mark Green, Bloomberg’s opponent in the general
election, received public funds and spent $16 million in total—more
than any other mayoral candidate in history aside from Bloomberg
himself.23
In 2005, the Act’s contribution limitations and prohibitions, as well
as its disclosure requirements, were extended to all candidates for
municipal office, regardless of whether they chose to participate in
the voluntary public fund program.24 In 2007, the matching rate was
increased again to $6-to-$1, with a maximum match of $1,050 (or up
to a contribution of $175).25 That legislation also implemented strict
contribution limits on those doing business with the city, in order to
curb actual and perceived “pay-to-play” contributions.26
One thing that has kept New York City’s matching funds program
relevant and effective—unlike the presidential public financing
system—is that the Program has adapted to changing circumstances
(the increase in the matching rate and the new limitations described
above provide two examples). The Board is mandated to review how
the Act worked in each election and make recommendations for
20. 2001 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 21; see also N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., supra
note 16, at 3.
21. See N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., supra note 16, at 3.
22. Id. at ix.
23. Id. at 5.
24. 2005 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 105. These limits were recently challenged and
upheld by the state Supreme Court. See McDonald v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., No.
100038/2013, 2013 WL 1925022 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 1, 2013).
25. 2007 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 34.
26. Id.
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changes.27 As a result, the Act has been amended twenty-one times
since it first passed.28
B.

Provisions of the New York City Campaign Finance Act

The CFB is a nonpartisan, independent board comprised of five
members.29 The mayor appoints two of the members, not more than
one of whom may be enrolled in any one political party.30 Likewise,
the speaker of the City Council appoints two members, not more than
one of whom may be enrolled in any one political party.31 The mayor
appoints the chair in consultation with the Council speaker.32 The
Board has a tradition of independence that has served it well.33 In
addition to regulating campaign finance, the CFB oversees several
different voter education initiatives. For example, the CFB long has
published the voter guide, which is a pamphlet that contains profiles
of municipal candidates and voter education material.34 It is
distributed to every household with a registered voter before both the
primary and general elections.35 The voter guide is currently printed
in English and Spanish citywide and in Chinese and Korean in
Brooklyn, Queens, and Manhattan, pursuant to the Voting Rights
Act.36 Additionally, since the 1997 elections, the CFB has sponsored
All citywide candidates
debates among citywide candidates.37
participating in the public matching funds program must appear in the

27. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-713 (2012); see also Murphy, supra note 7, at 8–9.
28. See 2007 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 23; 2007 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 34; 2007
N.Y.C. Local Law No. 67; 2006 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 17; 2005 N.Y.C. Local Law No.
105; 2004 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 58; 2004 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 59; 2004 N.Y.C. Local
Law No. 60; 2003 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 12; 2003 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 13; 2003
N.Y.C. Local Law No. 43; 2001 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 21; 1998 N.Y.C. Local Law No.
27; 1998 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 39; 1998 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 48; 1996 N.Y.C. Local
Law No. 90; 1994 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 37; 1993 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 68; 1990
N.Y.C. Local Law No. 69; 1989 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 4.
29. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1052(a)(1) (2009).
30. Id.; N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-708(1).
31. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1052(a)(1); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-708(1).
32. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1052(a)(1); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-708(1).
33. See Murphy, supra note 7, at 13–15.
34. See N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD. R. 10-02(a) (2010).
35. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1053.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1973. For the 2013 elections, the guide will also be published in
Bengali in certain areas of Queens. BD. OF ELECTIONS IN THE CITY OF N.Y.,
REGISTRATION & VOTING, available at http://vote.nyc.ny.us/downloads/
pdf/documents/boe/fourlanguages/registrationandvotingenglish.pdf.
37. Debate Program, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., http://www.nyccfb.info/
debates/overview.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
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debates.38
Since January 2011, the CFB has also assumed
responsibility for citywide voter engagement initiatives in conjunction
with its Voter Assistance Advisory Committee.39
The Act covers five municipal offices: three citywide (mayor,
public advocate, and comptroller); borough president, for each of the
five boroughs; and City Council, for each of the fifty-one districts.40
All candidates for those offices, even those who choose not to
participate in the Program, must provide comprehensive disclosure to
the CFB.41 This disclosure is filed electronically and posted on the
CFB’s website in both searchable and summary form.42
All candidates must adhere to the Act’s strict contribution limits.43
Citywide candidates, for example, may not accept aggregate
contributions from a single source exceeding $4,950.44
These
contribution limits apply throughout the primary and general
elections.45 All candidates are subject to a post-election audit by the
CFB and may be penalized for accepting over-the-limit
contributions.46 Non-participating candidates may spend as much as
they wish on their own campaigns,47 while participating candidates
may spend up to three times the otherwise applicable contribution
limit.48 There is a third class of candidate: limited participants. These
candidates agree to subject themselves to the spending limit, entirely
self-fund their campaigns, and are ineligible to receive public funds.49

38. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-709.5 (2012).
39. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1054(b).
40. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3-702(1), (13), (14).
41. See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1052(a)(8); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(6).
42. Searchable Database, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., http://www.nyccfb.info/
searchabledb (last visited Jan. 15, 2013); Campaign Finance Summary, N.Y.C.
CAMPAIGN
FIN.
BD.,
http://www.nyccfb.info/VSApps/WebForm_Finance_
Summary.aspx?as_election_cycle=2009&sm=press_12 (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
43. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(1)(f) (adjusted for inflation pursuant to N.Y.C.
ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(7)). The contribution limits for borough president and City
Council are $3,850 and $2,750, respectively. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(7); 2013
Limits, Requirements, and Public Funds, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD.,
http://www.nyccfb.info/candidates/candidates/limits/2013.htm (last visited Feb. 3,
2013).
44. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(1)(f) (adjusted for inflation pursuant to § 3703(7)).
45. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(1)(a).
46. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3-710, 3-711.
47. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-719(2)(b).
48. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(1)(h).
49. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-718.
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Contributions from individuals or entities doing business with the
city are subject to stricter limits. For example, the “doing business”
contribution limit for citywide office is $400.50 “Doing business with
the city” is defined broadly for these purposes. It includes those
associated with entities seeking or holding contracts, franchises, or
concessions; entities which obtain grants, pension investment
agreements, or economic development agreements; entities which are
parties to real property transactions or land use actions; and
registered lobbyists.51 Further, all candidates are prohibited from
accepting contributions from corporations, limited liability
companies, and partnerships.52 Finally, all candidates are subject to
comprehensive audits by the CFB to ensure compliance with these
limits and prohibitions and to ensure that the disclosure is accurate.53
More relevant to this Article are the requirements of those who
choose to opt into the voluntary public financing program.
Candidates join the Program by filing a certification on or before
June 10 in the year of the election.54 In the certification, among other
things, the candidates agree to adhere to strict expenditure limits.
These expenditure limits are divided into three periods: there is a
spending limit for the period before the election year, for the primary
election, and for the general election. The primary and general
election expenditure limit for mayoral candidates, for example, is
$6,426,000.55
In order to be eligible for public financing, candidates must be in
compliance with the Act and Board Rules, appear on the ballot, be
opposed on the ballot, and meet a two-part threshold, which is
structured to guarantee that only candidates who achieve a certain

50. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(1)(a). Contributions from these individuals are
also not eligible to be matched with public funds. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-702(3)(h).
The doing business contribution limits for borough president and City Council are
$320 and $250, respectively. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(1-a); 2013 Limits,
Requirements,
and
Public
Funds,
N.Y.C.
CAMPAIGN
FIN.
BD.,
http://www.nyccfb.info/candidates/candidates/limits/2013.htm (last visited Mar. 24,
2013).
51. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-702(18).
52. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(1)(l).
53. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-710.
54. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(1)(c).
55. See generally N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-706. These are adjusted for inflation.
Id. § 3-706(1)(e). The spending limit for public advocate and comptroller is
$4,018,000. Id. The spending limit for borough president is $1,446,000 and for City
Council $168,000. Id. The pre-election year limits are: $303,000 for citywide offices,
$135,000 for borough president, and $45,000 for City Council. Id.
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level of viability within their communities receive public funds.56 The
first component of the threshold is a dollar threshold: candidates must
raise a certain dollar amount in matchable contributions from New
York City residents.57 The second component is the number
threshold, which requires that candidates raise a certain number of
contributions of at least $10 from contributors in the geographic area
they seek to represent.58 For example, a City Council candidate must
raise at least $5,000, including at least seventy-five contributions of
$10 or more, from contributors within his or her Council district in
order to receive public funds.59 Once a candidate has demonstrated
eligibility, he or she is eligible to receive six dollars for every dollar in
contributions he or she receives from New York City residents, up to
$175.60 Thus, a $175 contribution from a New York City resident is
worth $1,050 in public matching funds. Public funds payments are
capped at fifty-five percent of the applicable spending limit.61
Participants who run against high spending nonparticipants are
eligible to have their spending limit raised, and if the nonparticipating
opponent’s spending reaches three times the applicable spending
limit, the participant’s spending limit is lifted entirely.62 Prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,63 participants facing high spending
nonparticipants were eligible to receive increased matching funds at a
higher matching rate.64
In November 2010, voters in New York City passed a Charter
amendment requiring the CFB to promulgate rules regulating the

56. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(1)–(2), (5).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. The threshold for mayor is $250,000 and 1,000 contributions from city
residents. For public advocate and comptroller, the threshold is $125,000 and 500
contributions from city residents.
For borough president, the threshold is
contributions from 100 borough residents. The threshold dollar amount is based
upon the number of persons living in each borough. The dollar amount (based on
the 2010 census) for each borough is: Bronx, $27,702; Brooklyn, $50,094; Manhattan,
$31,717; Queens, $44,614; and Staten Island, $10,000. Id.
60. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(2).
61. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-705(2)(b). The maximum public funds are
$3,534,300 for mayor, $2,209,900 for public advocate and comptroller, $795,300 for
borough president, and $92,400 for City Council. Id.
62. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-706(3).
63. 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
64. See infra notes 138–37 and accompanying text.
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disclosure of expenditures by independent entities.65 The Board
enacted those rules in March 2012.66 The rules require those who
make independent expenditures above a certain threshold for an
election to any office covered by the Act to file regular disclosure
reports, which include identifying information about the spender, the
amount that was spent, what was purchased, and which candidate or
candidates were mentioned in the materials financed by the
expenditure.67 In addition, entities making independent expenditures
of $5,000 or more must report the names of their contributors.68
As addressed below, the increasingly narrow views espoused by
modern courts with regard to what types of campaign finance
regulation are permissible under the First Amendment threaten to
diminish the efficacy of the Program’s restrictions and requirements.
The next section will recount the relevant jurisprudence, both at the
Supreme Court level and as pertains to New York City’s program.
II. EVOLVING JURISPRUDENCE
A. Supreme Court
The origins of modern campaign finance jurisprudence lie in

Buckley v. Valeo,69 a challenge to certain provisions of the Federal
Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, as amended in 1974.70 The
1974 amendments, passed by Congress after the Watergate scandal
revealed pervasive financial corruption during the 1972 presidential
campaign, imposed limits on contributions by individuals, political
parties, and PACs; limited spending by candidates and parties for
national conventions; closed a loophole that had allowed candidates
to use an unlimited number of political committees for fundraising
purposes; required reporting and disclosure of contributions and
expenditures above a certain threshold; and established the Federal
Election Commission (FEC) to enforce the law and oversee
disclosure and public financing.71
In Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld the provisions of FECA
that limited individual contributions to campaigns and required
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1052(a)(12), (15).
R.C.N.Y. tit. 52, ch. 13 (N.Y. Leg. Publ’g Co. 2012).
N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1052(a)(12), (15).

Id.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).

Id. at 6.
See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 118–19 (2003).
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reporting and disclosure of contributions and expenditures above a
certain level, but struck down its limitations on expenditures by
candidates, campaigns, and independent spenders.72 Regarding the
contribution limit provisions, the Court held that a “contribution
serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his
views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the
support,”73 and that accordingly, limitations thereon impose “only a
marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free
communication”74 and “do not undermine to any material degree the
potential for robust and effective discussion of candidates and
campaign issues by individual citizens, associations, the institutional
press, candidates, and political parties.”75 The Court further stated
that Congress had justifiably concluded that large monetary
contributions to campaigns must be eliminated in pursuit of the
interest in preventing the appearance of impropriety.76
The Court, however, viewed expenditures in a different light than
contributions. Noting that “[t]he First Amendment affords the
broadest protection to . . . political expression in order ‘to assure (the)
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people,’”77 the Court effectively equated
the expenditure of funds for political communications with the
underlying communications themselves.78 Finding that FECA’s
limitations on expenditures by candidates, campaigns, and
independent spenders constituted “substantial rather than merely
theoretical restraints on the quality and diversity of political speech,”
the Court applied strict scrutiny and ultimately held that the
72. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 3 (1976).
73. Id. at 21.
74. Id. at 20.
75. Id. at 29.
76. Id. at 30.
77. Id. at 14 (quoting Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
78. Id. at 19 (“A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend
on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of
expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually every
means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of
money.”); see also id. at 52–53 (“The candidate, no less than any other person, has a
First Amendment right to engage in the discussion of public issues and vigorously
and tirelessly to advocate his own election and the election of other candidates.
Indeed, it is of particular importance that candidates have the unfettered opportunity
to make their views known so that the electorate may intelligently evaluate the
candidates’ personal qualities and their positions on vital public issues before
choosing among them on election day.”).

LOPREST & PERSKIE_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

650

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

5/27/2013 7:22 PM

[Vol. XL

restrictions were sufficiently burdensome that they could not be
justified by the government interest in preventing corruption or the
appearance thereof.79 Going further, the Court declared, “The use of
personal funds reduces the candidate’s dependence on outside
contributions and thereby counteracts the coercive pressures and
attendant risks of abuse to which the Act’s contribution limits are
directed.”80 The alternative government interest in “equalizing the
relative financial resources of candidates competing for elective
office” was deemed insufficient as well.81 The Court did, however,
uphold the imposition of expenditure limits on candidates as a
condition of acceptance of public funds.82
Buckley’s conflation of campaign spending with political speech,
and the implication that self-financing and independent spending
provide immunity from corrupt influences, laid the groundwork for
several holdings by the Roberts Court, each of which has made it
more difficult for public financing systems to counteract the
advantages held by self-financed candidates or those with wealthy
independent supporters.83 Moreover, since Buckley, the Court has
rejected all proposed justifications for campaign finance restrictions
other than prevention of quid pro quo corruption or the appearance
thereof, purportedly because such prevention is the only justification
recognized by the Court.84 This presumption overlooks the particular
circumstances underlying Buckley, wherein the anticorruption
interest was the only one that existed. That the 1974 FECA
amendments were specifically addressed at targeting corruption does
not mean that no other government interest could be sufficient to
necessitate similar restrictions, and the Court in Buckley never stated
or implied so. The Roberts Court, however, has repeatedly adopted
and applied that interpretation.85

79. Id. at 19, 44–58.
80. Id. at 53.
81. Id. at 54.
82. Id. at 57, n.65.
83. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct.
2806 (2011); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Davis v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
84. See, e.g., Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2826–29; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911;
Davis, 554 U.S. at 726.
85. See generally DANIEL R. ORTIZ, THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK
ch. 3 (2005); IF BUCKLEY FELL: A FIRST AMENDMENT BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING
MONEY IN POLITICS, (E. Joshua Rosenkranz ed., 1999).
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First, Davis v. Federal Election Commission struck down a
provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) that
relaxed contribution limits on candidates whose opponents’
expenditure of personal funds exceeded a threshold amount,
regarding this asymmetrical scheme as a penalty against high
spending candidates that impermissibly burdened their First
Amendment right to political speech.86 Relying on what it called the
“fundamental nature of the right to spend personal funds for
campaign speech” established in Buckley,87 the Court stated that the
provision would impose “an unprecedented penalty” on candidates
who “robustly exercise[d]” that right.88 Under strict scrutiny, the
existence or appearance of corruption was held insufficient to justify
the burden, based on the Court’s reasoning in Buckley that reliance
on personal funds reduces the threat of corruption.89 The Court
further declined to acknowledge “level[ing] electoral opportunities
for candidates of different personal wealth” as a legitimate
government objective.90 The Court noted that if the increased
contribution limits were applied “across the board,” there would be
no basis for a challenge; the asymmetry of the scheme as applied,
however, was deemed an impermissible burden on a self-financing
candidate’s “First Amendment right to spend his own money for
campaign speech.”91
Two years later, in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, the Court held that the BCRA’s restriction on
independent spending by corporations was an infringement upon
corporations’ First Amendment rights, and that the burden was not
justified by the governmental interest in preventing the existence or
86. 554 U.S. 724, 738–39 (2008).
87. Id. at 738.
88. Id. at 739 (“[The provision] requires a candidate to choose between the First
Amendment right to engage in unfettered political speech and subjection to
discriminatory fundraising limitations. Many candidates who can afford to make
large personal expenditures to support their campaigns may choose to do so despite
[the provision], but they must shoulder a special and potentially significant burden if
they make that choice.”).
89. Id. at 740–41.
90. Id. at 741;see also id. (“[P]reventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far
identified for restricting campaign finances.” (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Miss. Gov’t
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 428 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); id. (“noting ‘the interests the Court has recognized as compelling, i.e., the
prevention of corruption or the appearance thereof’” (quoting Randall v. Sorrell, 548
U.S. 230, 268 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment))).
91. Id. at 737–38 (2008).
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appearance of corruption.92 The Court relied on Buckley’s distinction
between contribution limits and expenditure limits, noting that the
former “have been an accepted means to prevent quid pro quo
corruption[,]” and opined that “independent expenditures, including
those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the
appearance of corruption.”93
The Court found that, “[a]s a
‘restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on
political communication during a campaign,’ [the BCRA] ‘necessarily
reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached.’”94 After determining that Citizens United, as a corporation,
was entitled to First Amendment protection of its expenditures,95 the
Court applied strict scrutiny and found that the “chilling effect” of
limits on independent expenditures “extend[s] well beyond the
Government’s interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption.”96
Overruling McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, which had
described limiting the government’s interest in this manner as a
“crabbed view of corruption” which “ignores precedent, common
sense, and the realities of political fundraising,”97 the Court held that
“[t]he fact that speakers may have influence over or access to elected
officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt.”98
Most recently, Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC
v. Bennett struck down the “trigger” provisions of Arizona’s public
financing program, which granted supplemental matching funds to
candidates whose self-financed opponents’ spending, combined with
that of independent groups in support of the self-financed candidates

92. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
93. Id. at 357 (“The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an
expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the
expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be
given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.” (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
id. (“[I]ndependent expenditures have a ‘substantially diminished potential for
abuse.’” (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47)).
94. Id. at 339 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19).
95. Id. at 342–43 (“[P]olitical speech does not lose First Amendment protection
‘simply because its source is a corporation.’ . . . The Court has thus rejected the
argument that political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated
differently under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not
‘natural persons.’” (internal citations omitted)).
96. Id. at 357.
97. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 152 (2003).
98. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359.
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or in opposition to their opponents, exceeded the amount of public
funds initially allotted to publicly financed candidates.99 Relying on
Davis, the Court found that although such provisions do not prohibit
self-financed candidates from spending at a high level, they force such
candidates to “shoulder a special and potentially significant burden if
they make that choice.”100 A public financing scheme may not punish
candidates for the “vigorous exercise of the right to use personal
funds to finance campaign speech.”101 The Court acknowledged that,
as stated in the dissenting opinion, it has never held a “viewpointneutral subsidy given to one speaker to constitute a First Amendment
burden on another”; it noted, however, that none of the previously
upheld subsidies had been “given in direct response to the political
speech of another, to allow the recipient to counter that speech.”102
The Court further emphasized that it was this trigger component of
the system, rather than the amount of money provided to publicly
financed candidates, that made the program problematic.103 Rejecting
the state’s argument that the provision ultimately created more
speech rather than hindering it, the Court responded that any
resulting increase in speech by publicly financed candidates would
come “at the expense of impermissibly burdening (and thus reducing)
the speech of privately financed candidates and independent
expenditure groups.”104
Having ruled that the trigger provisions constituted an undue
burden under the First Amendment, the Court turned to the question
of whether the burden was justified by a compelling state interest.105
“Leveling the playing field” was, again, dismissed as such a
justification.106 Reiterating the conclusions reached in Buckley and
Davis, the Court also rejected the concept of limiting expenditures by
candidates or independent entities as a way to reduce the existence or
appearance of corruption.107 Finally, the Court rejected the state’s

99. 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011).
100. Id. at 2823 (quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 739 (2008)).
101. Id. at 2818 (quoting Davis, 554 U.S. at 739).
102. Id. at 2822.
103. Id. at 2824.
104. Id. at 2820–21.
105. Id. at 2825–28.
106. Id. at 2825 (“We have repeatedly rejected the argument that the government
has a compelling state interest in ‘leveling the playing field’ that can justify undue
burdens on political speech.”).
107. “Burdening a candidate’s expenditure of his own funds on his own campaign
does not further the State’s anticorruption interest. Indeed, we have said that
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suggestion that the provisions could reduce corruption or the
appearance thereof by encouraging candidates to participate in the
public financing program.108 The Court did acknowledge that public
financing of campaigns could further “‘significant governmental
interest[s],’ such as the state interest in preventing corruption,” but
reiterated that public financing schemes must be administered “in a
manner consistent with the First Amendment.”109
Opponents of campaign finance regulation have relied upon these
recent court rulings in challenging existing public financing schemes,
including, as discussed in the next section, that of New York City.
B.

Judicial Challenges to the New York City Program

In 2009, several candidates for New York City office, lobbyists, and
other interested parties sought a judgment declaring certain
provisions of the Act to be unconstitutional.110 Specifically, the
plaintiffs objected to the Act’s “pay to play” rules, pursuant to which
no candidate for New York City office may receive contributions
from a corporation, limited liability company (LLC), or partnership.111
The “pay to play” rules also subject contributions from individuals or
entities doing business with the city to a reduced per-contributor limit
and prohibit those contributions from being matched with public
funds.112 Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bennett, the parties
entered into an agreement stipulating that the Act’s “bonus
provisions,” which had provided for additional public funds to be
awarded to participating candidates opposed by non-participants who
‘reliance on personal funds reduces the threat of corruption’ and that ‘discouraging
[the] use of personal funds[ ] disserves the anticorruption interest.’” Id. at 2826
(quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 740–41 (2008)). “That is
because ‘the use of personal funds reduces the candidate’s dependence on outside
contributions and thereby counteracts the coercive pressures and attendant risks of
abuse’ of money in politics.” Id. (quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S.
724, 740–41 (2008); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 53 (1976)). “The matching funds
provision counts a candidate’s expenditures of his own money on his own campaign
as contributions, and to that extent cannot be supported by any anticorruption
interest.” Id.
108. Id. at 2827 (“[T]he fact that burdening constitutionally protected speech might
indirectly serve the State’s anticorruption interest, by encouraging candidates to take
public financing, does not establish the constitutionality of the matching funds
provision.”).
109. Id. at 2828 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 n.65).
110. Ognibene v. Parkes, 599 F. Supp. 2d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
111. Id. at 437–38; see also N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3-702(3), 3-703(1)(a)–(b), (l)
(2012).
112. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3-702(3), 3-703(1)(a)–(b), (l).
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spent above a certain threshold, were unconstitutional and would not
be enforced.113 However, the Second Circuit upheld the pay to play
rules when it determined that the rules were “closely drawn to
address the significant governmental interest in reducing corruption
or the appearance thereof.”114 A petition for certiorari was filed in
the Supreme Court on March 19, 2012, but the Court declined to hear
the case, allowing the circuit court’s ruling to stand.115
The Second Circuit cited Buckley and Davis for the proposition
that contribution limits and prohibitions are acceptable provided that
they are “closely drawn to address a sufficient state interest,” while
noting the Supreme Court’s consistent acknowledgement of
“preventing actual and perceived corruption” as a sufficient
interest.116 The court found that the Act’s “doing business” limits fell
outside the scope of Citizens United because they concern
contributions rather than expenditures; they are limits rather than
prohibitions; and they address the appearance of corruption, rather
than the appearance of influence.117 Because the “doing business”
limits “are only indirect constraints on protected speech and
associational rights,” the court subjected them to the “closely drawn”
standard of review rather than strict scrutiny118 and held that the limits
were properly designed to prevent the perception of corruption.119
With regard to the prohibition on matching funds for contributions
from individuals or entities doing business with the city, the court
found the provision more analogous to a limit than a ban, noting that
“[n]on-matching does not prevent someone from making a

113. Order Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) Regarding New York City
Administrative Code §§ 3-706(3)(a)(ii), 3-706(3)(a)(iii), 3-706(3)(b)(ii), & 3706(3)(b)(iii), Ognibene v. Parkes, No. 08-CV-1335(LTS)(THK) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16,
2011).
114. Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 28
(2012).
115. Ognibene v. Parkes, 133 S. Ct. 28 (2012) (mem.).
116. Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 183 (“It is not necessary to produce evidence of actual
corruption to demonstrate the sufficiently important interest in preventing the
appearance of corruption.” (citations omitted)).
117. Id. at 185–86.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 187 (“When those who do business with the government or lobby for
various interests give disproportionately large contributions to incumbents,
regardless of their ideological positions, it is no wonder that the perception arises that
the contributions are made with the hope or expectation that the donors will receive
contracts and other favors in exchange for these contributions. The threat of quid pro
quo corruption in such cases is common sense and far from illusory.”).
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contribution, but it does minimize the value of the contribution.”120
The court thus applied the less stringent standard of review and held
that the non-matching provision was also closely drawn to address a
sufficiently important government interest.121
The corporation provision, however, is a prohibition rather than a
limit and is therefore subject to a stricter standard.122 The court
referred to the four justifications that the Supreme Court recognized
for the federal ban on corporate contributions, including “the anticorruption interest already discussed,”123 which the court found to
apply to LLCs, limited liability partnerships (LLPs), and partnerships,
just as it did to corporations, noting that “the organizational form of
an LLC, LLP, and partnership, like a corporation, creates the
opportunity for an individual donor to circumvent valid contribution
limits.”124 The court thus held that the extension of the entity ban to
cover LLCs and partnerships in addition to corporations was closely
drawn because “the legal distinctions between [LLCs, LLPs, and
partnerships] and corporations do not make them less of a threat of
corruption or circumvention.”125
The plaintiffs in Ognibene also challenged the Act’s so-called “sure
winner” and “expenditure limit relief” provisions in a motion for
partial summary judgment.126 The sure winner provision reduces the
maximum amount of matching funds available to participants unless
their opponents have either raised, spent, or contracted to spend,
more than twenty percent of the applicable expenditure limit.127 A
participant who wishes to receive a full payment of public funds may
also submit a Statement of Need with accompanying documentation
verifying that his or her opponent satisfies at least one of seven
indicia that the opponent will constitute a legitimate challenge.128 The
120. Id. at 193.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 194–95.
123. Id. at 194–95 (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154
(2003)).
124. Id. at 195 (citations omitted).
125. Id. at 195–97.
126. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, Ognibene v. Parkes, No. 08 Civ. 1335(LTS)(FM), 2013 WL
1348462 (S.D.N.Y Apr. 4, 2013).
127. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-705(7)(a) (2012); Ognibene v. Parkes, No. 08
Civ. 1335(LTS)(FM), 2013 WL 1348462, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2013).].
128. The conditions include: (1) a non-participating candidate or a limited
participating candidate who has the ability to self-finance; (2) a candidate who has
received endorsements from specified high-profile individuals or entities; (3) a
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purpose of this provision is to conserve taxpayer dollars by preventing
the award of maximum public funds to candidates who face minimal
opposition.129 The expenditure limit relief provision increases the
spending limit for participating candidates opposed by nonparticipants who have raised or spent more than half the applicable
expenditure limit; if a non-participant raises or spends more than
three times the expenditure limit, the limit on his or her participating
opponent’s spending is removed entirely.130 This provision was
intended to reduce the burden imposed by the Program’s expenditure
limits on participants whose opponents are not bound by such limits.
The plaintiffs likened the sure winner and expenditure limit relief
provisions to the trigger provisions struck down in Davis and
Bennett.131 The defendants filed a cross-motion for partial summary
judgment, arguing that rather than awarding additional funds to a
candidate in response to spending by his or her opponent or creating
an asymmetrical funding scheme, the sure winner provision “simply
preserves the public fisc by minimizing public financing of
participating candidates in non-competitive races,” and the
expenditure limit relief provision, “if anything, restores symmetry by
first raising, and then removing, expenditure limits asymmetrically
imposed by the Program upon participating candidates but not upon
their nonparticipating opponents.”132
On April 4, 2013, the court upheld the expenditure limit relief
provisions because, unlike the scheme struck down in Bennett, they
candidate who has had significant media exposure in the twelve months preceding
the election; (4) a candidate who has received 25 percent or more of the vote in an
election within the last eight years for an office in an area that overlaps with the area
that is the subject of the current election; (5) a candidate whose name is substantially
similar to the candidate’s so as to result in confusion among voters; (6) a candidate
who is a chairman, president, or district manager of a community board (city council
or borough-wide races only); and (7) a candidate whose immediate family member
holds or has held elective office in all or part of the covered area in the past ten years.
See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §3-705(7)(b).
129. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment & in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment at 5, Ognibene v. Parkes, No. 08 Civ. 1335(LTS)(FM), 2013 WL 1348462
(S.D.N.Y Apr. 4, 2013).
130. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-706(3)(b)(i).
131. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, Ognibene v. Parkes, No. 08 Civ. 1335(LTS)(FM), 2013 WL
1348462 (S.D.N.Y Apr. 4, 2013).
132. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment & in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment at 2, Ognibene v. Parkes, No. 08 Civ. 1335(LTS)(FM), 2013 WL 1348462
(S.D.N.Y Apr. 4, 2013).
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“do not put non-participating candidates to the choice of refraining
from speech or causing their participating opponents to receive direct
infusions of public money.”133 With regard to the “circumstantial
trigger” component of the sure winner provisions, which increases a
participant’s eligibility for public funds upon the submission of a
Statement of Need identifying indicia that the participant’s opponent
constitutes a legitimate challenge,134 the court held that no substantial
First Amendment burden existed.135 The court held, however, that
the “monetary triggering” component of the sure winner provisions
was an undue burden on the First Amendment rights of candidates,
and that the provisions could not be justified by the government’s
interest in preventing corruption or the appearance thereof.136
Accordingly, for all elections beginning in 2013, the Board will
require a Statement of Need from any participant seeking to be
eligible for the maximum amount of public funds, regardless of the
level of spending and fundraising by that candidate’s opponent or
opponents.137
As discussed below, these holdings by the Supreme Court and by
lower courts have created barriers to the enforcement of restrictions
on campaign finance, thus enabling wealthy candidates and
independent spenders to influence elections more than ever before.
III. IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT HOLDINGS ON CAMPAIGN
FINANCE

A. High Spending Candidates
Wealthy individuals who run for office have always enjoyed a builtin advantage, which was magnified when spending limits were

133. Ognibene v. Parkes, No. 08 Civ. 1335(LTS)(FM), 2013 WL 1348462, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2013).
134. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
135. Ognibene, 2013 WL 1348462, at *10–11.
136. Id. at *8–10; see also id. at *10 (“[T]he fact that burdening constitutionally
protected speech might indirectly serve the State's anticorruption interest, by
encouraging candidates to take public financing, does not establish the
constitutionality of the matching funds provision.” (quoting Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at
2827); id. (“[T]he fact that the State may feel that the matching funds provision is
necessary to allow it to ‘find[ ] the sweet-spot’ and ‘fine-tun[e]’ its public funding
system, to achieve its desired level of participation without an undue drain on public
resources, is not a sufficient justification for the burden.” (quoting Bennett, 131 S. Ct.
at 2827)).
137. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-705(7)(b) (2012).
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deemed impermissible. As Justice Stevens wrote in his dissent in

Randall v. Sorrell,
When campaign costs are so high that only the rich have the reach to
throw their hats into the ring, we fail to protect the political process
from undue influence of large aggregations of capital and to
promote individual responsibility for democratic government.
States have recognized this problem, but Buckley’s perceived ban on
expenditure limits severely limits their options in dealing with it.138

Despite widespread and well-publicized concerns over Citizens
United, high spending by independently wealthy candidates is
nothing new. Candidates in every election since the CFB’s first
election in 1989139 have run against high spending non-participants.
However, over the course of the CFB’s history, high spending nonparticipants have run in fewer than ten percent of covered elections.140
Most of these have been City Council races, and most involved an
incumbent (whether participant or non-participant) who was
reelected.141
The goal of the Program is not to match non-participants’ spending
with public funds, but rather to provide participating candidates with
sufficient resources to get their message out to the voters. The
clearest example of this has been the past three mayoral elections.
Michael Bloomberg, the billionaire founder and chief executive
officer of Bloomberg L.P., has spent approximately $266 million on
his three campaigns for mayor.142 Each of his general election

138. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 278 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
139. In 1989, Ronald Lauder ran as a nonparticipant in the Republican primary
against Rudolph Giuliani and was defeated although Lauder spent approximately $13
million of his own money. See N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., THE IMPACT OF HIGHSPENDING NON-PARTICIPANTS ON THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE PROGRAM 3 (2006),
available
at
http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/issue_reports/High-Spending-WhitePaper.pdf.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 8–9. From 1997 to 2005, there were twenty-eight races with a highspending non-participant.
Of these, twenty-four were City Council races.
Incumbents won in fifteen out sixteen of these races. In the other eight, four
participants won and four non-participants won. Id.
142. In 2001, Bloomberg spent $73.9 million; in 2005, he spent $84.6 million. See id.
at 10. In 2009, he spent $108 million. See N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., NEW YORKERS
MAKE THEIR VOICES HEARD: A REPORT ON THE 2009 ELECTIONS 8 (2010)
[hereinafter N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., REPORT ON 2009 ELECTIONS], available at
http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/per/2009_PER/2009PostElectionReport.pdf.
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opponents was a participant in the Program.143 After the 2001
election, many believed that the Program was in trouble based on the
wide discrepancy in campaign spending by the mayoral candidates
(Bloomberg spent $73.9 million to Mark Green’s $16.2 million).144
The margin of victory, however, was very small—only 35,000 votes.145
Former CFB Chairman Father Joseph A. O’Hare, S.J. commented,
“in [the Green campaign’s] view, a swing of only 35,000 votes,
presumably, would have spelled success for the Program.”146 In
subsequent elections, the spending disparity grew, but the margins of
victory demonstrate that, due to the Program, the participating
candidate continued to be able to get his message out. In 2009, Bill
Thompson was outspent by almost $100 million (Thompson spent
$9.3 million, Bloomberg $108.3 million), but lost the election by only
about 50,000 votes, or five percent.147 Tom Robbins of The Village
Voice stated that the election was “an absolutely amazing failure of
big money in a campaign.”148
However, both Green and Thompson received significant
additional public funds when facing Bloomberg—additional public
funds that are no longer available after the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Bennett because they were received pursuant to the Act’s “trigger”
provisions.149 Further, the runaway spending at the federal level by
independent actors creates cause for alarm about the potential for
elections to become the purview of only the richest or those with the
richest friends. The Supreme Court has declared that providing

143. See N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., REPORT ON 2009 ELECTIONS, supra note 142,
at 8; N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., PUBLIC DOLLARS FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD: A
REPORT
ON
THE
2005
ELECTIONS
13–17
(2006),
available
at
http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/per/2005_PER/2005_Post_Election_Report.pdf; N.Y.C.
CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., REPORT ON 2001 ELECTIONS, supra note 16, at 25–29.
144. See N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., REPORT ON 2001 ELECTIONS, supra note 16,
at xiii, 5.
145. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., REPORT ON 2009 ELECTIONS, supra note 142, at
11.
146. See N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., REPORT ON 2001 ELECTIONS, supra note 16,
at xiii.
147. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., REPORT ON 2009 ELECTIONS, supra note 142, at 8.
148. Election Day 2009: GOPers Sweep Governor Races; Bloomberg Wins Tight
NYC Mayoral Race; Dems Take House Seats; Maine Repeals Gay Marriage,
DEMOCRACY NOW! (Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.democracynow.org/2009/
11/4/election_day_2009_gopers_sweep_governor.
149. See Order Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) Regarding New York City
Administrative Code §§ 3-706(3)(a)(ii), 3-706(3)(a)(iii), 3-706(3)(b)(ii), & 3706(3)(b)(iii), Ognibene v. Parkes, No. 08-CV-1335(LTS)(THK) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16,
2011).
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electoral opportunity is not a sufficient justification for limiting the
free speech rights of other candidates.150 At some point, however,
Justice Stevens’s concerns ring true, and there is a need for balance.
B.

Independent Expenditures

In addition to exacerbating the dichotomy between rich and poor
candidates, the evolution of campaign finance jurisprudence has
vastly increased the degree to which high spending independent
groups can attempt to influence the outcome of elections. The impact
of Citizens United has been immediate and tangible, with
independent groups and their often anonymous donors poised to
dominate the field of political speech.
Shortly after Citizens United was decided, the D.C. Circuit Court
heard a case brought by SpeechNow, an advocacy group funded in
part by unaffiliated donors, which planned to produce and broadcast
political advertisements during the 2010 election cycle.151 SpeechNow
had requested an advisory opinion from the FEC to determine
whether it must register as a political committee and whether
donations it received would be considered “contributions” and thus
be subject to federal limits.152 The FEC issued a draft advisory
opinion answering both questions in the affirmative, which prompted
SpeechNow, along with five individual plaintiffs, to seek an injunction
barring the FEC from enforcing contribution limits with respect to
donations given to SpeechNow.153
After eliminating all the
government interests previously rejected by the Supreme Court as
insufficient to justify restrictions on political contributions, the court
reiterated that only “the government’s anticorruption interest” could
provide such a justification, and, relying on Citizens United, held that
“the government has no anticorruption interest in limiting
independent expenditures.”154
Applying that logic, the court
concluded, “contributions to groups that make only independent
expenditures also cannot corrupt or create the appearance of

150. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct.
2806, 2825 (2011).
151. SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 689–90 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
152. Id. at 689.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 692–93 (emphasis in original).
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corruption.”155 Accordingly, donations made to independent spenders
were held not to be subject to contribution limits.
In the wake of Citizens United and SpeechNow, independent
groups, including so-called “super PACs,” can both raise and spend
money in unlimited quantities. In 2010, independent expenditures for
candidates in the federal midterm elections quadrupled the amount
spent by outside groups in 2006.156 Moreover, the percentage of
spending by groups that were not required to disclose their donors,
such as 501(c)(4) nonprofit organizations, increased from 1% in 2006
to 47% four years later.157 Independent spending in the Republican
presidential primaries from January 1 to 25, 2012, increased more
than 1600% from the same period in 2008, and 44% of all ads aired
during that time were funded by outside interest groups, compared
with 3% in the 2008 primaries.158 The groups making these
expenditures rely heavily on large donations; 93% of super PAC
funds raised in 2011 came from contributions of $10,000 or more.159
State and local elections have likewise seen a drastic increase in
independent expenditures.
In Arizona, which provides public
financing to candidates for state office, outside spending on state
elections more than doubled between 2006 and 2010.160 During the
same period, independent spending in North Carolina rose 468%,161
and in Iowa, it increased by a factor of twenty-eight.162 In San
Francisco, a city with a public financing program similar to New

155. Id. at 694.
156. Spencer MacColl, Citizens United Decision Profoundly Affects Political
OPEN
SECRETS
BLOG
(May
5,
2011,
11:16
AM),
Landscape,
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/05/citizens-united-decision-profoundly-affectspolitical-landscape.html.
157. See id.
158. Erika Franklin Fowler, Outside Group Involvement in GOP Contest
Skyrockets Compared to 2008, WESLEYAN MEDIA PROJECT BLOG (Jan. 30, 2012),
http://mediaproject.wesleyan.edu/2012/01/30/group-involvement-skyrockets.
159. Blair Bowie & Adam Lioz, Auctioning Democracy: The Rise of Super PACs
and the 2012 Election, WESLEYAN MEDIA PROJECT BLOG (Feb. 8, 2012),
http://www.demos.org/publication/auctioning-democracy-rise-super-pacs-and-2012election.
160. Independent Spending in Arizona, 2006–2010, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY ST.
POL.
(Aug.
12,
2011),
http://www.followthemoney.org/press/
ReportView.phtml?r=456.
161. Independent Spending in North Carolina, 2006-2010, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY
ST.
POL.
(Dec.
20,
2011),
http://www.followthemoney.org/press/
ReportView.phtml?r=472).
162. Independent Spending in Iowa, 2006-2010, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY ST. POL.
(Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.followthemoney.org/press/ReportView.phtml?r=464.
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York’s, independent spending in the 2011 mayoral election totaled
nearly $2.6 million,163 compared with less than $30,000 four years
earlier.164 This level of outside spending dramatically increases the
potential for the appearance of undue influence. One news report
stated that the independent spenders in San Francisco’s mayoral
election included “[b]usinesspeople with financial stakes in city
contracts, real-estate professionals involved in major development
projects, and investors in San Francisco companies who stand to
benefit from specialized tax breaks.”165
In addition to a lack of financial regulation, interest groups seeking
to influence federal elections have benefited from the FEC’s lenient
interpretation of the concept of coordination, allowing campaigns and
outside groups to engage in cooperated efforts disguised as
independent spending in order to circumvent contribution limits.166
The founder of one super PAC aimed at defeating Suzan DelBene’s
2012 congressional campaign was the mother of DelBene’s opponent,
Laura Ruderman.167 When asked about the super PAC, Ruderman
claimed that she was “just as surprised as everyone else” to learn of
its origins, as well as the $115,000 expenditure her mother’s
organization had made on her behalf.168
Pursuant to FEC regulations, a “communication is coordinated
with a candidate, an authorized committee, a political party
committee, or an agent of any of the foregoing when the
communication . . . [i]s paid for, in whole or in part, by a person other
than that candidate, authorized committee, or political party
committee,” and satisfies certain standards of content and conduct.169
The conduct standards, used to determine whether there is
“agreement or formal collaboration” between a campaign and an
independent spender, include a “[r]equest or suggestion” made by a

163. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., DISCLOSURE OF INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES IN NEW
YORK CITY ELECTIONS 5 (2012).
164. SAN FRANCISCO ETHICS COMMISSION, 2007 MAYORAL PUBLIC FINANCING
PROGRAM AND A FEASIBILITY AND COSTS STUDY OF A FULL PUBLIC FINANCING
PROGRAM 6 (2008).
165. Rebecca Bowe, The Billionaire’s Mayor, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN (Oct. 18, 2011).
166. See, e.g., UPDATE: Anti-Suzan DelBene PAC Funded by Mother of
Opponent Laura Ruderman, SEATTLE TIMES (July 15, 2012, 11:05 AM),
http://blogs.seattletimes.com/politicsnorthwest/2012/07/15/anti-suzan-delbene-pacfunded-by-mother-of-opponent-laura-ruderman/.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(a) (2013).
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candidate or his or her authorized committee or political party
committee regarding the communication in question; “material
involvement” by the candidate or his or her committees in decisions
regarding certain aspects of the communication; “[s]ubstantial
discussion” between the individual or entity sponsoring the
communication, or his or her employees or agents, and the candidate
who is clearly identified in the committee or his or her committees or
opponent; a “[c]ommon vendor” shared by the candidate and the
independent spender, where such vendor is contracted or employed
for the creation, production, or distribution of the communication;
and a “[f]ormer employee or independent contractor” of the
candidate or his or her committees who either pays for the
communication or conveys certain types of information to the
communication’s sponsor.170
The practical application of these regulations by the FEC has
created massive loopholes in terms of what constitutes coordination
of purportedly independent expenditures.171 In one high-profile
example, the Commission deadlocked 3-3 on the decision of whether
a series of advertisements sponsored by American Crossroads
advocating for the reelection of certain incumbent members of
Congress
would
constitute
coordinated
communications.172
Incredibly, American Crossroads’ own acknowledgment that the
advertisements in question “would be fully coordinated with
incumbent Members of Congress . . . insofar as each Member would
be consulted on the advertisement script and would then appear in
the advertisement”173 did not, in the estimation of three of the FEC
commissioners, resolve the issue of whether the ads were
coordinated.
New York City has also begun to see an increase in independent
spending.
In the weeks before the 2009 elections, the
Communications Workers of America, Local 1180 ran a television
commercial opposing Michael Bloomberg.174 Although the ad did not
mention Bloomberg’s opponent, Bill Thompson, or even directly urge
170. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d) (2013).
171. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion Request from Am. Crossroads to Fed. Election
Comm’n, AOR 2011-23 (Oct. 28, 2011).
172. Certification, American Crossroads, AO 2011-23 (F.E.C. Dec. 5, 2011).
173. Advisory Opinion Request from Am. Crossroads to Fed. Election Comm’n,
AOR 2011-23 (Oct. 28, 2011).
174. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., DISCLOSURE OF INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES IN
NEW YORK CITY ELECTIONS 9 (2012), available at http://www.nyccfb.info/pdf/
issue_reports/disclosure-of-independent-expenditures-in-nyc-elections.pdf.
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a vote against Bloomberg, its electioneering tagline was clear: “Tell
Republican Michael Bloomberg: NYC is not for sale.”175 Further, in
the 2009 elections, the Independence Party, with funding from real
estate interests, spent significant amounts in four City Council races
in which the progressive Working Families Party supported
Bloomberg’s opponents.176 These examples and others were the fuel
that led to the Board’s recommendation that disclosure be required of
independent spenders in New York City elections, and to the passage
of the Charter amendment authorizing the Board to require such
disclosure.177
IV. SMALL DONOR DEMOCRACY
Presuming that we don’t want to be left with the specter raised by
Justice Stevens—a system in which only a limited number of people
have the wherewithal to run for even the lowest elected office—what
can be done to combat the increase in spending by self-financed
candidates and outside actors? The Supreme Court has cut off
permissible methods for governments to assist candidates faced with
either high spending opponents or independent spenders. Therefore,
there needs to be a new way to solve these problems. As stated by
the Campaign Finance Institute (“CFI”) in a 2001 report,
[t]he requirement is to use policy methods [that] do not restrict or
inhibit speech. It is both constitutional and perfectly appropriate to
promote participation by building up instead of squeezing down—to
dilute the power of the few by increasing the number and
importance of low-dollar donors and volunteers.178

After the 2008 presidential election, it was widely believed that the
use of technology to mobilize small donors could be sufficient to elicit
campaign participation in large numbers.179 The Internet eliminates
many of the barriers to reaching potential contributors and voters in a

175. Id.
176. See N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., REPORT ON 2009 ELECTIONS, supra note 142,
at 170–71.
177. See id. at 180–81.
178. MICHAEL J. MALBIN ET AL., CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., CHANGING THE GAME BY
EXPANDING THE PLAYING FIELD: PUBLIC FINANCING OF ELECTIONS AFTER CITIZENS
UNITED AND ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE 1 (2011) (emphasis omitted), available at
http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/state/CFI_Report_Small-Donors-in-Six-Midwestern-States2July2011.pdf.
179. See, e.g., MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 19, at 24.
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cost-effective fashion.180 The success of President Obama’s 2008
campaign in using the Internet to reach contributors was inspiring.181
Even Obama’s 2008 campaign, however, raised most of its funds
through larger donations.182 Hence, relying on the Internet as a sole
method of increasing participation may not be sustainable.
One way to increase participation by individuals is through the use
of small donor matching funds programs, like New York City’s. The
Program, with its multiple match of six dollars for every dollar
contributed by a New York City resident up to a maximum amount, is
viewed as a model to encourage this type of participation.183 The
Supreme Court has endorsed public financing as a method of building
public participation in the political process.184 As New York State has
considered adopting its own public financing system, the City’s
program has been lauded as an example for the state to follow.185
One of the primary objectives of the small dollar multiple match
program is to empower New York City voters to be more engaged in

180. ANTHONY J. CORRADO ET AL., JOINT PROJECT CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., AM.
ENTER. INST., BROOKINGS INST., REFORM IN AN AGE OF NETWORKED CAMPAIGNS:
HOW TO FOSTER CITIZEN PARTICIPATION THROUGH SMALL DONORS AND
VOLUNTEERS 10 (2010), available at http://www.cfinst.org/books_reports/Reform-inan-Age-of-Networked-Campaigns.pdf.
181. See id. at 12.
182. CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., CFI ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES’ DONOR
REPORTS
(2008),
available
at
http://www.cfinst.org/press/preleases/08-1124/Realty_Check_-_Obama_Small_Donors.aspx.
183. See, e.g., Editorial, Give Small Political Donors a Voice, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23,
2012, at A24; Alec Hamilton, Campaign Finance Ruling May Make NYC a Model for
the Nation, WNYC (June 21, 2011), http://www.wnyc.org/articles/its-freecountry/2011/jun/21/campaign-finance-ruling-may-make-new-york-model-nation.
184. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92–93 (1976) (“[Public financing] is a
congressional effort not to abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public
money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in the electoral
process, goals vital to a self-governing people.”).
185. See, e.g., Thomas Kaplan, Wealthy Group Seeks to Reform Election Giving
in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/12/
nyregion/coalition-urges-public-financing-in-new-york-state-elections.html;
Bill
Mahoney, Campaign Finance Reform: What’s Needed Besides Public Financing?,
GOTHAM GAZETTE (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/
component/content/article/86-elections/1431-campaign-finance-reform-whatsneeded-besides-public-financing; Sundeep Iyer & Michael Malbic, Reform Campaign
Finance, Give All Residents a Voice, J. NEWS, July 17, 2012, available at
http://nylead.org/2012/07/25/journal-news-opinion-reform-campaign-finance-give-allresidents-a-voice; Press Release, N.Y. Leadership for Accountable Gov’t, NY LEAD
Calls for Campaign Finance Reform for NYS to Restore Fairness in Elections (Feb.
15, 2012), available at http://nylead.org/2012/02/15/ny-lead-calls-for-campaignfinance-reform-for-nys-to-restore-fairness-in-elections.
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the political system.186 Among the Program’s goals is encouraging
New Yorkers to become more engaged by giving small contributions,
while also incentivizing candidates to seek those small contributions
from the voters. As stated in the CFB’s 2009 post-election report:
Raising funds from a broad range of small donors, rather than a
narrow band of wealthy donors, gives candidates access to a wider
range of perspectives on city issues. At the same time, candidates
who work to cultivate small contributors are helping to create a
more active class of supporters . . . .187

By these measures, the multiple match program has been very
successful. In the 2009 elections, 68.9% of all contributors gave $175
or less, compared with 58.5% in 2001 and 56.5% in 2005.188 Although
the total amount of money coming from small donations remains low,
the percentage of total dollar contributions in small amounts has also
increased over time. In 2009, 14.8% of all funds raised came from
contributions of $175 or less, compared with 10% in 2001 and 8.5% in
2005.189 Even more encouraging is that many of these small donors
are new contributors, having given for the first time in the 2009
election. More than half of all the New York City contributors in the
past three citywide elections have been first-time donors. These firsttime donors are also likely to be small contributors; 80% of new
donors in 2009 contributed $175 or less.190
After conducting a study of the small donor issue in New York City
for the 2005 and 2009 elections, the CFI found that “multiple
matching funds sharply increase the proportional role of small
donors; . . . increase[] the number of people who contribute; and . . .
shift[] the demographic and class profile of those who give, making
the system more representative of the population as a whole.”191 The
study found that 37% of the funds that City Council candidates
received in 2005 and 2009 came from individuals whose contributions
aggregated to less than $251.192 When the public funds associated

186.
187.
103.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See, e.g., MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 19, at 11–13.
N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., REPORT ON 2009 ELECTIONS, supra note 142, at
Id.
Id.
Id. at 102–05.

Michael J. Malbin et al., Small Donors, Big Democracy: New York City’s
Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and States, 11 ELECTION L.J. 3, 4 (2012).
192. Id. at 8 tbl.1.
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with those contributions were added, the percentage jumped to
64%.193
The CFI further concluded that only 9% of contributions to nonparticipants in 2005 were in the amount of $250 or less; in 2009, it was
only 15%. Both figures were much lower than the percentage of
small donors to participants in the Program.194 Anecdotally, City
Councilmember Mark Weprin, who spent fifteen years as a state
assemblyman and was a participant in the Program in 2009, recounts
that he focused his fundraising on small donors, and attributes that
focus to the multiple match program, unlike his previous campaign
for state office. His average contribution was just $240, despite his
ability to raise much larger contributions.195
The CFI also found that although some of the increase in small
donors could be explained by large donors spreading their money
around, there also was an empirically measurable increase in
participation.196 “The 2009 election . . . saw a 55 percent increase in
the number of donor-to-candidate pairs below $175. This clearly was
a substantial increase in participation and not simply reshuffling of
old money.”197 This increase can certainly be explained by the
legislative change between 2005 and 2009, which raised the matching
factor from four to six; this effect on participation was the exact
purpose of the matching rate increase. The increase in contributor
participation occurred notwithstanding a decline in voter turnout
during the same period, from 33% in 2005 to 26% in 2009.198
Further, these increasing numbers of small donors have made the
donor pool more diverse, both geographically and demographically.199
In 2009, 89% of the City’s census bloc groups had at least one

193. Id.
194. Id. at 10.
195. MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 19, at 14.
196. Malbin et al., supra note 191, at 10. CFI tested the “reshuffling” theory by
looking at contributions given at exactly the largest contribution eligible for matching
funds. In 2005, this was $250 and in 2009, it was $175. The surmise was that strategic
donors would give exactly at that maximum. See id.
197. Id. at 12.
198. Id.
199. See generally ELISABETH GENN ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE &
CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., DONOR DIVERSITY THROUGH PUBLIC MATCHING FUNDS
(2012),
available
at
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/
publications/DonorDiversityReport_WEB.PDF.
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donor.200 Most of the donations of $1,000 or more to both city and
state candidates came from the Upper East Side and Upper West
Side of Manhattan.201 Research shows that “candidates for City
Council are searching for and finding small donors in every corner of
the city.”202 These contributors are also more demographically
representative of the entire city, in terms of both racial and economic
characteristics.203
Another benefit of this increase in small donors is that candidates
are connecting with their constituents, using fundraising to build
volunteer and voter outreach.204 One candidate commented: “Under
the NYC system, candidates are incentivized to build networks of
small donors who become networks of organizers. The most costeffective fundraising and the most persuasive organizing takes place
at the same spot: in supporters’ living rooms.”205
Some opponents of public financing argue that contribution and
expenditure limits “are unlikely to effectively restrain candidates and
parties involved in competitive elections for high stakes.”206
According to a report published by the Cato Institute, the public’s
trust in government has continued to decline since public financing
was first instituted for the presidential elections in 1976, thus
undermining the theory that public financing systems counteract the
appearance of corruption that can result from large campaign
contributions.207 The author of the report, John Samples, further
argues that the government should not be in the business of easing
the burden associated with fundraising for a political campaign, which
is fundamentally a private problem.208 Samples has also argued that
nearly all campaign finance law, at least on the federal level, is an
intrusion upon citizens’ First Amendment rights.209 He contends that
200. Malbin et al., supra note 191, at 6. New York City has 5,733 census block
groups that each have between 600 and 3,000 people. CFI found that 5,128 of these
block groups were home to at least one donor-to-candidate pair. Id.
201. GENN ET AL., supra note 199, at 10.
202. Id. at 13.
203. Id. at 14–15.
204. MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 19, at 14.
205. Id. at 18 (quoting David Yassky).
206. John Samples, The Failures of Taxpayer Financing of Presidential Campaigns,
CATO INST. 3 (Nov. 25, 2003), http://www.cato.org/doc-download/sites/
cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa500.pdf.
207. Id. at 5–6.
208. Id. at 13–14.
209. JOHN SAMPLES, THE FALLACY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 1 (2006); see
also Bradley Smith, The Myth of Campaign Finance Reform, NAT’L AFF., Winter
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on the whole, contribution limits will reduce the amount of political
speech, while having no measurable impact on the existence or
appearance of corruption.210 Similarly, in an article published by
National Affairs in 2010, Bradley Smith maintains that contributions
do not corrupt politicians.211
The Supreme Court has rejected the theory that large contributions
have no relationship to corruption.212 Indeed, the potential for such
corruption is widely accepted as the primary justification for the First
Amendment burden that results from restrictions on the amount of
money spent on political speech.213 Moreover, the notion that the
difficulties associated with campaign fundraising are fundamentally a
private issue overlooks the fact that fair and clean elections, in which
candidates have the ability to share their beliefs and ideas regardless
of their financial means, are in the best interest of the government
and its citizens. Finally, both Samples and Smith focused their
analyses on the presidential public financing system, which faces
different challenges than New York City’s system. The presidential
system, as detailed by Samples’s report for the Cato Institute, has
declined in efficacy in recent years, culminating in President Obama’s
decision to opt out of the program as a candidate in 2008.214
Conversely, as demonstrated by the CFI report described above, the
New York City Program has been increasingly successful at
encouraging small donations from a diverse pool of contributors and
has maintained a high percentage of candidate participation.
Others argue that there is no problem to cure; that in holding that
corporations can spend unlimited amounts on elections, the Supreme

2010,
at
75,
88,
available
at
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/
20091228_Smith.pdf (“Restrictions on campaign contributions and spending affect
core First Amendment freedoms of speech, press, and assembly.”).
210. SAMPLES, supra note 209, at 256–57.
211. Smith, supra note 209.
212. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 356–57
(2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976) (“To the extent that large
contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential
office holders, the integrity of our system is undermined. Although the scope of such
pernicious practices can never be reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples
surfacing after the 1972 election demonstrate that the problem is not an illusory
one.”).
213. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29.
214. Adam Nagourney & Jeff Zeleny, Obama Forgoes Public Funds in First for
Major Candidate, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/06/20/us/politics/20obamacnd.html.
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Court has done nothing more than protect the First Amendment.215
They contend that more spending merely leads to more political
discourse, which is the highest form of speech.216 This argument fails
to recognize the corrupting influence of this unfettered spending in
modern day campaigning.217 First Amendment considerations must
be balanced by protections against such corruption for ordinary
citizens, as both candidates and contributors, to be a relevant part of
the political process.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has ushered in an era in which
self-financed candidates and wealthy individuals and organizations
can spend independently on elections in unprecedented amounts,
while simultaneously limiting the options for combating this effect. In
order to avoid the hijacking of our elections by this flood of money,
elections must be returned to the ordinary citizen.218 One way to
achieve this goal is to encourage these citizens to participate through
a small donor multiple match system. New York City’s landmark
program has proven effective at increasing participation and is viewed
as a model for other public financing systems on the local, state, and
federal level.

215. See generally Floyd Abrams, Citizens United and Its Critics, 120 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 77 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/9/29/abrams.html; Floyd Abrams &
Burt Neuborne, Debating Citizens United, NATION, Jan. 31, 2011,
http://www.thenation.com/article/157720/debating-citizens-united.
216. See Abrams, supra note 215; Abrams & Neuborne, supra note 215.
217. See generally Zephyr Teachout, Facts in Exile: Corruption and Abstraction in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 295 (2010).
218. The non-partisan Center for Responsive Politics predicts that the 2012 federal
elections will cost $5.8 billion, of which at least $750 million will be spending by
outside groups. See 2012 Election Will Be Costliest Yet, With Outside Spending a
Wild Card, OPENSECRETS (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.opensecrets.org/
news/2012/08/2012-election-will-be-costliest-yet.html.

